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A PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL
DAviD C. BAYNE, S.J.t
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the modern corporation has undergone an essential
evolution. Control-the ultimate power in the policy-making hierarchy
-has emerged as the central element in the corporation. With this
emergence have come novel and subtle problems and an insistent need
for an appropriate body of new law.
The law has approached the concept of control gingerly. At this
early stage two roughly antagonistic positions have been taken by the
courts, crystallized in the famous Perlman v. Feldmann' in the mid-
fifties and in Honigman v. Green Giant Co.,2 concluded in early 1963.
These prototypes set up the antithesis, and provide factual settings for
the major policy questions underlying the philosophy of control.
A. Perlman v. Feldmann
Treating the position of control as a separate office in the corpo-
rate structure, C. Russell Feldmann simultaneously occupied four dis-
tinct offices in Newport Steel Corporation. He joined the office of
control to that of dominant stockholder, chairman of the board, and
president of the corporation.
During the Korean War steel shortage, Newport devised the
"Feldmann Plan" by which the company would guarantee its customers
a source of supply on the condition of interest-free prepayment for
purchases. The Wilport Company, a syndicate formed by a group of
end-users of steel, bought control in Newport by purchasing, at a pre-
mium, the Feldmann shares. Mr. Feldmann was to sell control through
the seriatim resignation of his own board and the election of Wilport's
nominees.
In a derivative action, minority stockholders of Newport sought
restitution of the "illegal gains which accrued . . . as a result of the
t"A.B. 1939, University of Detroit; M.A. 1946, Loyola University of Chicago;
LL.B. 1947, LL.M. 1948, Georgetown University; J.S.D. 1949, Yale University;
S.T.L. 1953, West Baden College. Member, District of Columbia, Michigan, and
Missouri Bars.
1219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952),
cert. denied, 349"U.S. 952 (1955).
2208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963).
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sale . . . of [the] . . . controlling interest in the corporation." '
The district court refused to grant to the minority "that share of [Feld-
mann's] . . . profit which is attributable to the sale of the corporate
power." ' The court held instead "that the rights involved in the sale
were only those normally incident to the possession of a controlling
block of shares, with which a dominant stockholder, in the absence of
fraud or foreseeable looting, was entitled to deal according to his own
best interests." - The Second Circuit reversed and "remanded to the
district court for a determination of the question expressly left open
below, namely, the value of defendants' stock without the appurtenant
control over the corporation's output of steel." 6 On remand the dis-
trict court awarded judgment for $1,339,769.62 plus interest.7
Pernman v. Feldmann is a landmark 8 case not only because the
court held that the majority shareholder had to account to the minority
shareholders, but because control itself was segregated as a separate
item of sale.9
B. Honigman v. Green Giant Co.
The Green Giant Company was founded in 1903, and by 1960 had
grown from a handful of employees and annual sales of some $7,000
to sales of $64 million and a net worth of $23,402,000. The man be-
hind this burgeoning growth was Edward B. Cosgrove, who with his
family has controlled the company for six decades.'"
At its foundation Green Giant had only one class of stock, but in
1923 the Cosgrove-dominated board amended the articles to create
Class A voting and Class B nonvoting shares." Mr. Cosgrove pos-
sessed 26 of the 44 voting shares.' Other than the Cosgroves, no
Class B shareholder-there were 428,998 shares held by 1,250 widely
3 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 174 (2d Cir. 1955).
4 Id. at 175.
4 Ibid.
6Id. at 178.
7 Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
S The Feldmann case is by no means unqualifiedly a perfect instance of the isolation
of control. Later analysis will place it in its proper perspective.
But see Swan, J., dissenting:
The controlling block could not by any possibility be shorn of its appurtenant
power to elect directors and through them to control distribution of the cor-
porate product. It is this "appurtenant power" which gives a controlling block
its value as such block. What evidence could be adduced to show the value
of the block "if shorn" of such appurtenant power, I cannot conceive, for it
cannot be shorn of it.
219 F.2d at 180.
10 See Record, pp. 49-70, Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir.
1962) [hereinafter cited as Record].
11 See id. at 52.
12 See id. at 50.
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dispersed public shareholders-possessed holdings of two percent.
There was no difference between the classes except for voting rights,
but the Class B stock represented 99.9 percent of the equity, earnings,
and dividend rights.
By 1960 the drawbacks of the nonvoting stock became disturbingly
manifest, and a recapitalization plan, 3 which provided for a single new
class of voting common stock, was overwhelmingly approved.' 4 The
Class B exchanged share for share; the Class A, 1,000 to one. Class
A equity increased from .01 percent to 9.3 percent, and its book value
increased from $2,200 to $2,200,000. As a result of the recapitaliza-
tion, the Cosgroves acquired for their Class A stock 26,000 of the new
common shares, which, combined with what they received for their
Class B holdings, gave them about 33 percent of the new common
stock.'"
In a class action in the federal district court a minority share-
holder sought to cancel the recapitalization plan and to set aside the
issuance of the $2.2 million premium shares. The plaintiff Honigman
alleged principally that the controlling shareholders were taking a $2
million bonus for something they did not own, since corporate control
as an item of sale, if salable at all, is a corporate asset.' 6
The court denied relief. The crux of the decision was the court's
readiness to place a premium value on the single element of control as
isolated from all other values. "In these 44 shares was lodged the
entire destiny of the company. It was the power of control which was
lodged in these few shares which created their value . . . . " " The
court did not advance any reasons directly explanatory of this extra
value, but stated:
No Class A shareholder could be expected to forego the power
of control of a company of this size without receiving in return
a consideration commensurate with the value of the control
which he foregoes. It seems evident, therefore, that in light
of the evidence in considering the fairness of the plan, we must
commence with the premise that the A shareholders in sur-
13 See id. at 55. The plan in detail is presented in the Revised Plan of Recapi-
talization submitted by Glore, Forgan & Co. Id. at 327-37.
14 The court placed considerable emphasis on the importance, questionable in the
light of the modern mechanics of proxy solicitation in a widely-held corporation, of
the near unanimity of approval by the Class B Shareholders (The Class A shares
were all cast in favor of the plan). "That fact speaks more persuasively than the
arguments of those who attempt to theorize on unrealistic principles of so-called
corporate democracy." 309 F.2d at 671 (1962).
1 See Record, p. 197. As a matter of fact, a more reliable calculation would
seem to place the figure at 25 percent. Brief for Appellant, p. 51, Honigman v. Green
Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962).
16 Id. at 44.
17208 F. Supp. at 759 (1961).
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rendering their exclusive voting rights were entitled to a
premium in exchanging their stock for the new voting com-
mon stock."8
The pervading spirit of the district court's opinion is best summarized
in the following: "[S] o far as the charge of immoral and reprehensible
conduct directed at the Class A stockholders is concerned, suffice it to
say that their position in this proceeding must be judged by that which
businessmen of ordinary prudence would have done under similar
circumstances." 19
The court of appeals affirmed unanimously, but did not consider
the fundamental issue-whether control is a salable asset. It relied on
the reasoning of the lower court and concluded summarily: "We are
satisfied that plaintiff has wholly failed to demonstrate that the court's
failure to apply the Berle rule, that corporate control is a corporate
asset, misapplied or misinterpreted the applicable Minnesota law." 20
In affirming the lower court, the court of appeals advanced negligibly
the understanding of the problem of control. Although a federal court
is limited in its ability to make innovations in state law, rarely has a
court been presented with such an opportunity to scrutinize closely the
isolated value of control as a distinct object of sale.
C. The Problem
Green Giant, set off against Perlman v. Feldmann, aptly poses the
questions for analysis of the philosophy of control. The answer to the
question of what constitutes the nature of control depends on a series
of principles which extends down to the philosophical foundation on
which the whole superstructure rests. The nature of control will there-
fore be approached in three parts: The Concept of Control; The Con-
cept of Corporate Control; The Salability of Corporate Control.
II. THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
Control is present in almost all areas of human activity. The
philosophical notion of control, once discovered and analyzed, has
certain distinct and definable elements which can be applied to any
situation, including the corporation. There are three common philo-
sophical elements constituting control: The Notion of Relation; The
Notion of Custody; The Principle of Finality.
18 Id. at 758.
19 Id. at 762.
20 309 F.2d at 670.
1963]
26 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
A. The Notion of Relation
At the foundation of this investigation is a basic metaphysical
principle: The relation between man and man entails a responsibility
of the one towards the other. Each man as a human person is intrin-
sically possessed of a complexus of rights which must be respected by
every other human being. When two people come into contact, the
responsibility of respecting these rights is immediately operative, but
the extent of the responsibility varies with the degree of dependency
involved in the relationship. The aphorism, "Give to each his due,"
summarizes the essence of responsibility.
The principle that relationship begets responsibility is clarified upon
reflection on the various types of human relations. The broadest cate-
gories of human relations are natural relations and assumed relations.
Some of the natural relations are founded on the social nature of man
himself, as is the relation of father to son. These are the relations of
the greatest dependence, and hence responsibility is the most grave.
There are also accidental relationships which arise almost fortuitously
but which are nonetheless natural. Thus, in a tortious contract between
persons, fleeting and temporary as it may be, there is the responsibility
of due care. Since, however, this type of relationship is of relatively
less dependency, the corresponding responsibility is relatively less grave.
Man also freely assumes many relationships. These relationships
may be either formally contractual, when the parties set down the terms
of the relation in the form, for example, of a constitution and bylaws,
or inferentially contractual, when the responsibility arises out of
justified reliance by one on another. An appropriate instance of an
assumed relation is that of lawyer to client. Quite obviously this rela-
tionship may be either formally contractual or based on justified re-
liance. It should be clear, moreover, that these assumed relationships
may be a combination of both formal and inferential elements. The
formal contract adds the note of fidelity to one's word and to the natural
responsibility already present without the contract.
B. The Notion of Custody
The notion of custody is also prominent in the development of a
philosophy of control. The study of this special relation involves a
second fundamental principle: Custody entails accountability.
This principle can best be understood by some reflections on the
most common form of custody, the ownership of one's own goods.
Whatever the asset of value which a person may possess, an accounting
of the use and disposition of that asset will inevitably be exacted.
[Vol.l12:22
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This is a basic law of human economy. An adolescent betrays a sense
of guilt at wasting food. A spendthrift is condemned by the community
for his waste of money. One who does not properly utilize the more
subtle spiritual and intellectual assets is held up for reprehension.
Accounting always follows upon stewardship.
But ownership is only one type of custody. When the custody is
of another's goods the governing principles do not change. Nor does
the accountability diminish. The custodian must guard and keep that
property as he would his own. Custody involves more than physical
possession; it is a stewardship. Since there is dependence, one who
undertakes stewardship of goods bears a corresponding responsibility
properly to care and account for them.
As in the case of simple relations, there are two types of custody,
natural and assumed. The custody of a father over a son, of the state
over a citizen, is natural and essential. Custody, however, may also
arise from the formal assumption of the care and stewardship of an-
other's goods. Or it may, as with other relations, be inferred by an
unspoken assumption through conduct or custom by one party or
justifiable reliance by another.
It is a short step from the responsibility for the custody of another's
goods, to the authority incumbent upon the exercise of that custody.
The collective term "responsibility" merely expresses a congeries of
duties. Yet one cannot be held to an accountability for the perform-
ance of duties without a corresponding set of rights which enable him
to perform these duties. Essential to culpability for nonperformance
is the ability to perform. The custodian must therefore possess what-
ever rights are necessary to fulfill his duties. Custody begets authority,
since authority is nothing more than the total body of rights necessary
to the proper exercise of the custody.
The concept of control, wherever found, is really a corollary
of the concept of the authority of custody. The notion of control does
not really add any new conceptual element to the combination of cus-
tody and authority. Custody expresses the idea of the assumption in
trust of something of value and the duties resultant on this assumption.
Authority, on its part, carries the notion of the rights consequent on
these duties. Control, finally, embodies both thoughts: the dominion
over another's goods and the duties and rights resultant on this do-
minion. In its broadest sense, control can be defined as the custody
over an asset of value and the complexus of duties and rights appur-
tenant to that custody.
There are two further considerations stemming from the cus-
todial aspect of control. In the first place, the extent of the custody
1963]
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determines the extent of the responsibility. If the custody is complete
or partial, the responsibility will be correspondingly complete or partial.
In terms of authority the reasoning is the same. The extent of the re-
sponsibility defines the orbit of authority, the rights of the office.
Control over a son illustrates the point. The father's orbit of responsi-
bility naturally extends to the total life of the son.2' The teacher at
school on his part may, in an assumed relation, accept custody over the
formal education of the boy, and the extent of the teacher's responsi-
bility is thereby coterminous with that assumption. But this does not
relieve the father of the ultimate obligation. So also in their respective
spheres do others have orbits of responsibility to the child defined by the
extent of their assumption of custody. In the end, however, the
father's orbit of responsibility remains total, the others' only partial.
The second consideration is also important. The simple assump-
tion of custody, although it defines the orbit or extent of the responsi-
bility, says nothing about the nature of that responsibility, but merely
establishes its existence and delineates its extent. It belongs to the
third philosophical element constituting control, the Principle of Final-
ity, to define the nature of the responsibility of control.
C. The Principle of Finality
The principle of finality-every being acts with its eye on its final
goal-is a basic metaphysical concept. Finality is the all-governing
norm of every activity. Expressed in terms of means to end, only that
specific means may be employed which will accomplish the end.
As the end or goal determines the means, so too do these means
determine the nature of the being. The nature or essence of a being
must be so formed as to be able to effect the activity which is directed
to the end. The end, therefore, not only determines the means, but
also determines the nature that is to be responsible for producing these
means. When this principle of finality is applied to the realm of
human conduct it is expressed in terms of duties and rights. A duty is
an obligatory end. A right is a guaranteed, inalienable means to the
fulfillment of the duty-end. No one is held to a duty without the cor-
responding right which will permit performance. The nature and
type of the right is defined exactly by the nature and type of the duty.
For a congeries of duties there is an appropriate congeries of rights.
The application of the principle of finality to the concept of control
leads to a definition of the nature, as distinguished from the orbit or
2 1 The fundamental flaw in the analogy of father-son is the free will of the son.
The son, after he reaches the age of reason, is sui juris, possessed of his own destiny,
rights, and duties, and hence not in the total custody of the father in this sense. His




extent, of control itself. Just as the rights-means are defined by the
nature of the duty-end, so also the intrinsic nature of the position of
control is defined and determined by the activity of that position. The
nature of the position must be capable of using the means to the end.
The opposite is also necessarily true. No act or action can emanate
from the nature of any position which is not the perfect reflection of
that nature or essence. Whence the adage: "You know a tree by its
fruits."
Since end and means, duties and rights, activity and nature are all
correlative, it is possible by studying one to know the other. Control
is the complexus of duties and rights possessed by the custodian of an-
other's goods. Close scrutiny of the purposes and objectives of con-
trol will reveal the true nature of control. Control must have the means
to achieve its end, the rights to fulfill its duties, a nature conformable
to its activities. The purpose, objective, end, goal of any control deter-
mines the nature or kind of that control.
By the junction of the principles derived from the Principle of
Finality to the principles derived from the Notions of Relation and
Custody, both the orbit and the nature of control are defined. It re-
mains now to apply this reasoning to the concept of corporate control.
III. THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE CONTROL
Since it is focal to the entire corporate enterprise, the newly emer-
gent concept of control takes on a preeminent role in the formulation of
a coherent philosophy of the modern corporation and in the law which
reflects that philosophy.
For all its importance, however, the law has never advertently
defined control. This is undoubtedly due to its relatively recent emer-
gence and, of course, the intricacy of the concept. But as corporate
legal thinking has matured, major outlines have gradually taken shape.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., gave the first substantial insights into the concept
in the early thirties.22  Little progress was made for nearly a quarter
century thereafter. In the mid-fifties, however, the notable Feldmann
case occasioned a flurry of commentaries, the most important being
those by Jennings, Leech, Hill, and Berle.' These studies resulted
in considerable progress. Their total impact was undeniable, and cer-
2 2 BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 243-46
(1932).
23 Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956) ; Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1956) ; Hill, The Sale
of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957) ; Berle, "Control" in Corporate
Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1958). See also Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control,
38 CHICAGO B. REcoRD 376 (1957) ; Comment, Sales of Corporate Control at a Pre-
inzium: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 1961 DuKcE L.J. 554 (1961).
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tainly they advanced the earlier thinking of Berle, but there remain as
yet many steps to be taken toward a definitive philosophy of control.24
Corporate control is an office, not a person. It has not reached the
stage, nor need it, where it rates the title designation on an office door.
But, unfortunately, the courts have not yet fully realized that it is a
separate position, essentially distinct from all others. As yet it exists
at law outside the group of formal members of the corporation. In the
present state of the law, moreover, control is not even classified with
the extracorporate parties: creditors, labor, consumers, government.
But, control rightfully belongs inside the legal entity, with the share-
holders, directors and officers.
In the ideal order, control as an individual entity, and not merely
as an attribute or quality inhering in another entity, could exist alone.
In some instances it has. It is not too difficult to imagine a situation
in which a person who wielded a noncorporate power over the majority
shareholder, such as a blackmailer, could hold control and yet not be a
party to the enterprise. Usually, however, this is not the case. Control
rarely has a completely independent existence, but instead coheres to
another office.
Control, moreover, is chameleon-like, skipping from place to place
in the corporate venture. Perhaps due to this opalescent nature, the
law has often confused control with the position to which it was joined.
Control might be thought to reside most properly in the shareholder-
owners, but in time of financial pressures it may shift to the bond-
holders or the preferred shareholders or even to the materialmen cred-
itors. When there is complete dependence on one or two customers,
control might rest in the consumer. So possibly, too, it might rest
in labor or the government. Finally, effective control, as distinguished
from the absolute ownership of more than fifty percent of the stock,
may be held by management, founded on mere incumbency and main-
tained by access to the corporate mechanics of proxy solicitation, per-
sonnel, and funds.25
24 There is some promise of an intensive inspection of corporate control in the
remand of Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962). The Second
Circuit, in three separate opinions, did not itself attempt a thorough exploration of
the subject, but sent the matter below. "But particularly in view of our lack of
knowledge of corporate realities and the current standard of business morality, I
should prefer to avoid too precise instructions to the district court in the hope that
if the action again comes before us the record will be generally more instructive on
this important issue than it now is." Id. at 579 (Clark, J., concurring). Judge Friendly
emphasized the importance of the question: "Here we are forced to decide a question
of New York law, of enormous importance to all New York corporations and their
stockholders, on which there is hardly enough New York authority for a really in-
formed prediction what the New York Court of Appeals would decide on the facts
here presented . . . ." Id. at 580.
25 Mere influence, however great, over corporate policy must not be confused with
the technical control under study. General Motors, for example, as a sole consumer,
will assuredly exercise considerable influence over a "captive" supplier corporation,
[Vo1.112:22
CORPORATE CONTROL
There is, moreover, a fascinating feature about the manner in
which control must express itself. As powerful as it is, control is
always dependent on the formality and mechanics of the shareholders'
vote at the annual or special meeting. It matters not whether corpo-
rate control is found within the strict limits of the legal entity or out-
side. Nor does it matter whether control is based on consumer in-
fluence, management incumbency, or 100 percent stock ownership.
Ultimate control must always assert itself formally, and as it were
mechanically, in the vote of shares at the shareholders' meeting. Mere
ownership of shares, therefore, need not mean control. Control is the
power over the shares by whomever owned, or dominion over the
owner of the shares. It is the last and absolute authority over cor-
porate policy.
Neither the exact location of control, the specific source of its
power, nor the necessary voting formalities are intrinsically important
to an analysis of control. Once this is understood, the problem re-
solves itself into segregating control qua control from the various other
corporate offices to which it coheres. Most of the difficulties in isolating
control are traceable to a confusion between the rights, duties, and
values of control qua control and the rights, duties, and values of some
other office in the corporate enterprise.26
The general philosophy of control must be applied to the specific
area of corporate control. The office of control is a responsibility and
a complexus of duties. The orbit of this responsibility is determined
by the extent of the custody of the corporation entrusted to control.
The nature and kind of this responsibility is defined by the principle
of finality.
The totality of these duties thus defined as to orbit and nature is
the fiduciary duty of corporate control. Correlative to this complexus
of duties, control possesses a complexus of rights which enables it to
meet its responsibility. This complexus of rights is the authority of
corporate control. Therefore, the elements of fiduciary duty and the
elements of authority together constitute the formal technical definition
of corporate control. Control is an office with the duties and rights
inhering in the position.
even to the point of determining the percentage of corporate return on investment, but
would not enter into complete top-level direction of the corporation. In the instances
of noncorporate parties-consumer, labor, government-the likelihood of full, technical
control is minimal.
26 Implicit here is an important question: Where should control be located? The
present investigation (1) locates control where it actually is, (2) assumes for the
present purposes only that it is properly so placed, and (3) analyzes the duties and
rights of control wherever found-in shareholder, director, officer, creditor. In which
party it belongs as a matter of right is a question which this Article does not answer.
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A. The Fiduciary Duty of Control
Fundamental to the concept of control is the basic question of the
nature of its fiduciary duty. The concept of fiduciary duty, wherever
found, carries answers to the essential and most vexing problems of the
philosophy of corporation law. This concept has never been ade-
quately explored. Mr. Justice Frankfurter asked incisive questions in
the important Chenery case," but did not supply all of the answers.
Other attempts have been made from time to time,28 but the broad
nature of fiduciary duty still remains as probably the greatest single
challenge to improvement in the evolution of modern corporation law.
The best analysis of the fiduciary duty of control lies in the suc-
cessive application to the several parties of the enterprise of: the Notion
of Custody, which traces the respective spheres of responsibility of each
corporate office, and the Principle of Finality, which defines the nature
of the responsibility.
1. The Notion of Custody
Within the strict legal entity there are three distinct, major spheres
of responsibility, located in a descending order of authority: corporate
control, the board of directors, the officers. The fourth inside party,
the shareholder, has such limited responsibilities qua shareholder as to
warrant only passing reference. Although control is the ultimate re-
siduum of all responsibility and is at the top of the hierarchy, this
responsibility is spread out over the entire venture in a broad pattern
of delegation and subdelegation down to the lowliest participant. With
each successive delegation the ambit of responsibility shrinks. Quite
clearly, external parties-creditor, labor, consumer, government-also
have their own responsibility, but it is of comparatively less importance.
Control has custody only, not ownership. The corporation is
merely entrusted to an office, not given to an individual. The cus-
todian must guard, guide, and nurture the corporation as if it were his
own, with full knowledge that it belongs to another. Custody is condi-
tional and indefinite in duration: conditional because it is dependent
upon the will of the owner; indefinite in duration because it may cease
whenever terminated by the owner.
27 "To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?
In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations ?" SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 86 (1943).
28 Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of Management-The Concept in the Courts, 35
U. DEr. LJ. 561 (1958); Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALiF. L.
REV. 408 (1962) ; Conway, The New York Fiduciary Concept in Incorporated Part-
nerships and Joint Ventures, 30 FORDHAm L. REv. 297 (1961) ; Note, The Trust Cor-
poration: Dual Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
713 (1961) ; Note, Economnic Institutions and Values: Fiduciary Responsibility of
Corporate Officers and Directors, 36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 343 (1961).
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Since the scope of control's responsibility is coterminous with the
extent of the custody, it follows that the responsibility of control is total
because the entire corporate entity has been entrusted to control. Since
legislatures and courts are just awakening to the problem, this total
commitment has as yet an extralegal status, unless the custody is
actually in the shareholders where the law still assumes it to be.
In logical evolution each important aspect of custody, the non-
ownership (mere custody) and the totality (total custody), produces
a major conclusion. Intrinsic to the notion of mere custody is the
deduction that the benefit flowing from the custody accrues to the
owner, not to the custodian.
The principle is well established that those in control of
the management of a corporation are under an inherent obli-
gation not in any manner to use their positions to advance
their individual interests as distinguished from the interests
they represent .. . ." He who is in such a fiduciary posi-
tion cannot serve himself first and his cestuis second ....
He cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate
the ancient precept against serving two masters . . . . He
cannot use his power for his personal advantage . . . . For
that power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation
that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, prefer-
ence, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detri-
ment of the cestuis3
Intrinsic to the notion of total custody is the deduction that the cus-
todian acts exclusively for the entity.
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does
not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the
corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence but upon a
broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the pur-
pose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of
profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the
fiduciary relation."
These two major conclusions form the keystone for the superstructure.
a. Custody in Analogous Areas
The central core of the trust relationship is identical to that of the
custodial relationship of corporate control 8 2 Both courts and com-
29 Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 435, 91 Atl. 423, 431 (1914).
30 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). (Footnote omitted.) This is a
two-edged sword. Not only does the benefit go to the entity, but significantly it does
not go to the custodian. "[H]e must be faithful to his fiduciary duties and must not
make a personal gain from performing them." Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173,
179 (2d Cir. 1955) (Swan, J., dissenting).
:31 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
32 "[T]hose responsible for the Restatement of Trusts proposed the following
definition or description of an express trust. It is a 'fiduciary relationship with respect
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mentators have been diverted from a wholehearted adoption of trust
law by a failure to acknowledge this identity. Both are relations of
mere custody; in both the custody is total. Those trust rules, therefore,
which apply to mere and total custody are applicable to that same cus-
todial aspect in the corporation. The most notable difference between
a trust and control of a corporation is that the trustee takes title; a
person in control of a corporation does not. Title is not essential for
custody. Any trust rules founded on passage of title, and therefore
noncustodial, are irrelevant to corporate control. The inability to dis-
card the differences and retain the parallels has been detrimental to an
enlightened evolution of fiduciary duty.
The growth of the trust as a business form confirms this parallel.
Over the three centuries of the crystallization of the corporate form,
English counsel had an almost unbelievable predilection for the trust,
often as a substitute for incorporation, sometimes in augmentation as
a second line of insulation. 3 Therefore, the basic body of trust law,
which is derived from the central custodial element of the trust, may be
validly employed in the law of corporate control. 4  In this sense, one
in control of a corporation may be described as a strict trustee.35
to property, subjecting the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties
to deal with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as the result
of a manifestation of an intention to create it.' In this definition or description the
following characteristics are to be noticed: (1) a trust is a relationship; (2) it is a
relationship of a fiduciary character; (3) it is a relationship with respect to property,
not one involving merely personal duties; (4) it involves the existence of equitable
duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit
of another; and (5) it arises as the result of a manifestation of intention to create
the relationship." I ScoTT, TRUSTS 36, 37 (2d ed. 1956).
33 See ScoTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH
JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 (1912); Du Bois, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COM-
PANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT, 1720-1800 (1938); HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND, 1800-1867 (Harvard Economic Studies 1936).
34 The plaintiff in Green Giant contended that the Cosgrove control, by refusing
any vote to the 99.99 percent equity, assumed just such a trust custody over the $23
million in assets behind the 450,000 nonvoting shares. Brief for Appellant, supra
note 15, at 29-33.
35 It is fascinating, in the light of all that has been and will be said, to follow
Austin Wakeman Scott in the early pages of his four-volume work on trusts as he
strives to penetrate to the heart of the trust relation:
The trust as a relationship. It will be noticed in the first place that we
have said that a trust is a "relationship" having certain characteristics. Legal
writers and courts have sometimes defined a trust as a certain kind of duty
or obligation. Such a definition is too narrow. It is true that looking at it
from the point of view of the trustee, there are duties owed by him to the
beneficiaries; but the trust is the whole of the juridical relationship, of which
the duties of the trustee are only one part. Some courts and legal writers
have defined a trust as a certain kind of right which the beneficiary has
against the trustee, or a certain kind of interest which the beneficiary has in
the trust property, thus looking at it from the point of view of the beneficiary.
While it is true that the beneficiary has the right or interest described, the
trust is something more than the right or interest of the beneficiary. The
trust is the whole juridical device, the legal relationship between the parties
with respect to the property which is its subject matter, and includes not
merely the duties which the trustee owes to the beneficiary and to the rest of
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The law of trusts has evolved a custodial rule identical to that
proposed for control. The exclusive benefit of all activity within the
scope of the custody belongs to the entity."0 One of the finer statements
of the trust philosophy came from Mr. Justice Burton:
The solution lies in making them accountable to their corpora-
tion for their profits from such an investment, much as a
trustee must account to his beneficiaries for his profits from
dealings in the subject matter of his trust. This result would
spring wholly from the fiduciary nature of the obligations
* * **It would need no proof of a breach of trust or of the
actual overreaching of anyone.3
Fletcher has discussed denomination of control as a trustee:
It has been held that if a majority stockholder actually
dominates the company, although not himself an officer,
through his control of a majority of the board of directors,
he stands in the same fiduciary relation to the other stock-
holders as he would sustain if he were a director or other
officer. Of course, if a majority stockholder is also a director
and the president or other chief officer of the corporation, he
is a trustee.38
The Restatement of Trusts lays down a rule in section 170 which
could be applied validly to corporate control: "( 1 ) The trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary." 39 In a comment on the section the Reporter notes
that the duty is confined to matters within the scope of the relation.
The obverse of the duty to the beneficiary is expressed in section 203:
"The trustee is accountable for any profit made by him through or
arising out of the administration of the trust, although the profit does
not result from a breach of trust." 40
the world, but also the rights, privileges, powers and immunities which the
beneficiary has against the trustee and against the rest of the world. It would
seem proper, therefore, to define the trust either as a relationship having
certain characteristics stated in the definition or perhaps as a juridical device
or legal institution involving such a relationship.
SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 32, at 37-38.
3
0 "A fiduciary relationship involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for
the benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the
relation. . . . [H]e is under a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary."
SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 32, at 38.
"Directors of a business corporation act in a strictly fiduciary capacity. Their
office is a trust. . . . The first principal duty arising from his official relation is to
act in all things of trust wholly for the benefit of his corporation." Schemmel v. Hill,
91 Ind. App. 373, 385-86, 169 N.E. 678, 682-83 (1930), quoted in Perlman v. Feld-
mann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
37 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304, 316 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
38 13 FLErcHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5811, at 157-59 (rev. ed. 1961).
3 9 
ESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 170 (1957).
40 Id. § 203.
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Those who would incorporate the law of trusts, as limited, into
the law of control 4' would agree that the then Judge Cardozo, ex-
pressed the ultimate rationale of the trust obligation when he stated
that:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday world for
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound
by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place.4 2 Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that
is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has
been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to under-
mine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating
erosion" of particular exceptions.3
Another parallel for corporate control exists in the law of agency.
Control is an agent and the corporation acts only through agents-
control, directors, officers.
4 1 Trust principles have made one clear inroad into corporation law in Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
As Judge Learned Hand commented:
Section 16(b) was passed "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use
of information which may have been obtained . . . by reason of his"-the
"beneficial owner's"-"relationship to the issuer." The section does indeed
cover trading by those who in fact have no such information, but that is true
as well of dealings between a trustee and his beneficiary: "A trustee with
power to sell trust property is under a duty not to sell to himself either at
private sale or at auction, whether the property has a market price or not,
and whether the trustee makes a profit thereby." Restatement of Trusts,
§ 170(1): Comment b. All such transactions are breaches of trust, and
§ 16(b) in effect made "beneficial owners" fiduciaries as directors and officers
were anyway . . . . The section forfeits the profits because it forbids dealings
in the shares. Nobody is obliged to become a director, an officer, or a
"beneficial owner"; just as nobody is obliged to become the trustee of a
private trust; but, as soon as he does so, he accepts whatever are the limita-
tions, obligations and conditions attached to the position, and any default in
fulfilling them is as much a "violation" of law as though it were attended by
the sanction of imprisonment.
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
42 This recalls the antithetical statement of the district court in allowing the
$2-million premium to control in Green Giant. In reply to the expert witness's defi-
nition of fiduciary duty, the court remarked:
I take it you are motivated by certain ethical principles and standards
which you think should be applied to a business transaction of this kind?
The Witness: This is the case, your Honor.
The Court: Rather than what the ordinary hardheaded businessman
would do under similar circumstances?
The Witness: This is correct, sir.
Record, p. 300-01 (testimony of Robert W. Storrer). The court in its decision, how-
ever, concluded: "[S]uffice it to say that their position in this proceeding must be
judged by that which businessmen of ordinary prudence would have done under similar
circumstances." Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 208 F. Supp. 754, 762 (D. Minn.
1961).
43 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
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Directors of a corporation are its agents, and they are gov-
erned by the rules of law applicable to other agents, and, as
between themselves and their principal, the rules relating to
honesty and fair dealing in the management of the affairs of
the principal are applicable. They must not, in any degree,
allow their official conduct to be swayed by their private in-
terest, which must yield to official duty.44
It seems legitimate, therefore, to borrow the strict rules of agency for
the analogous law of corporate control.
The same elements of exclusive devotion to the principal within
the scope of the custody, already elaborated for corporate control and
found prominently in the trust, lie at the heart of the agency relation-
ship. In trusts, agency, and control, custody is the vital factor.45 The
law of agency is adamant in ascribing to the principal all benefits reaped
from the relationship:
When the principal employs an agent, the law presumes that
he does so in order to secure to himself the benefits of the
agent's skill, experience or discretion, and to reap the fruits
of the performance of the undertaking. The law presumes
that he expects-and it gives him the right to expect-that the
agent so employed will endeavor to further the principal's
interests, and will use his powers for the principal's benefit.4 6
It is not a mere fortuity that the respective laws of agency, trust,
and the proposed law of corporate control involve an identical set of
principles, because they are founded on the same basic elements.
Corporate control is a voluntary assumption, or at least retention,
of the office by a person or a group of persons which comes into being
at the inception of the corporation. At the outset, control rests with
the promoters and initiating shareholders. It may reside there perma-
nently, or it may shift in time to new majority shareholders or to any
44 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (1955).
45 "Although an agent is in a fiduciary relation to his principal, as a trustee is
to the beneficiaries of the trust, the two relationships have a different history and
different consequences flow from them. The historians of early English law have
pointed out that in the Middle Ages the germ of agency is hardly distinguished from
what ultimately became the use or trust." SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 36, at 72.
4 6 MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 500 (4th ed. 1952). The law
of agency acts negatively as well by refusing to the agent any profits arising from
the agency.
An officer is but the agent of his corporation, and in all transactions in which
its interests are involved he must act for it with unselfish singleness of pur-
pose. If in any such transaction it appears that he has acted against the
interest of his corporation, the mere fact that the means used to accomplish
the unlawful end would, if standing alone, be lawful in themselves will not
save such officer from responsibility to account for profits thus made by him
which otherwise might have gone into the coffers of his corporation.
Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 417, 76 At1. 77, 79
(1910).
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of the many parties in the corporate venture. The important point,
however, is that control always has the custody of, and responsibility
for, the corporation. The person occupying corporate control can
abandon the office and thereby relieve himself of the responsibility.
But mere delegation never sloughs off the ultimate burden.
b. To Whom the Duty?
It is the corporate entity which has been taken into custody. The
primary duty, therefore, is to this entity. Neither this particular asset
nor that, neither this constituent member nor that, has been entrusted
primarily and directly to control. This does not mean, however, that
there is not a genuine, although secondary and indirect, duty to the
various members of the entity.
Some explanation of the meaning of the terms, "primary" and
"secondary," is advisable. There is no difficulty in realizing that the
total entity has been entrusted to control, and that therefore the direct
and primary duty is to the corporation itself. The difficulty lies in the
inclination to conclude that the duty ends there, or, at best, that the
words "indirect" and "secondary" mean little or nothing. But, there
is only one instance when the duty of control to the various parties, such
as minority shareholders, is not fully as primary and direct as it is to the
corporation. That occurs when there is a conflict between the good of
the entity and the good of one of the constituent parts. Then part
must yield to whole.
There is a tendency today to become entranced with the idea that
the corporate entity has an existence all its own which is completely
independent of its constituent parts, but a corporation, behind the legal
entity, is a society of members. The fiction of the entity should never
cloud the fact that the corporation is a society of persons with interests
entrusted to control. The entity theory is merely a mode of expressing
the idea that in any society the primary duty is to the common good
and the secondary to the members. The mere injection of the word
"entity" does not mean that both corporate control and the corporation
itself do not have custody of the interests of the several parties to the
entity.
It is the obligation of the corporate society to serve these persons.
The society has a primary position only in that it must flourish if it is
to perform its services to the individuals in the best way. In this way
the duty to the members is indirect. The corporation has an obligation
to guard, guide, and nurture the various parties which constitute it.
Corporate control has the same duty to the corporation. Control in
guarding, guiding and nurturing the entity fulfills its responsibility to
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the members. Only in this sense is the duty indirect and secondary.
Thus, any obligation of the entity becomes also the obligation of the
custodian of the entity.
c. Conflict of Interest
A stimulating discourse in Green Giant between the district court
and the plaintiff's expert witness, Storer, chairman of the investment
committee of The Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit, poses an
arresting hypothetical instance of the head-on clash between entity and
part.
The relevant dialogue began at the point at which Storer had
imposed the trust duty upon Green Giant control to correct the voting
deficiency in the structure, without a premium.' The-court inter-
jected: "Now, then, does that fiduciary relationship continue if the
stock is sold, if the class A stock is sold ?" 4 Storer replied that the
duty would accompany control. The court then set up the conflict of
interest:
Well then, supposing in your bank it so happened that
someone in connection with the Cosgrove family died and left
their some 23 shares of class A stock in trust . . . . And
then supposing a plan of capitalization arose somewhat com-
parable to this. Would you feel justified in voting the class
A stock, the 23 shares that you held on a plan that provided
one for one on the part of the class A stockholders? "
Storer's prompt reaction was the correct one: "If these, your Honor,
were the terms of the proposition that came to me as a question to vote
on it, I believe that I would vote favorably on such a proposal." 10 The
court countered: "Do you think that an ordinary prudent businessman
would vote in favor of such a proposal?" " Storer hedged for the first
time: "I have no clear conviction on that. I am of mixed feelings,
sir." 5 The court pressed its advantage:
Well, I take it as a trustee you would have to exercise judg-
ment and the care of the ordinary prudent man possessed of
47 This was another argument advanced by the plaintiff Honigman: Control has
a fiduciary duty to correct in 1960 the defect in the capital structure which it con-
sciously created in 1923. The very vote originally withheld must be restored, without
the payment of a personal premium of $2 million for such restoration. Brief for
Appellant, mspra note 15, at 29.
48 Record, p. 299.
49 Ibid.
5o Id. at 300.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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business judgment that would generally be attained by a man
reasonably experienced in business . . . . You can't put
into effect some individual theory of your own if you were a
trustee, could you? "
At this point, unable to resolve his primary obligation as control
with his secondary as trustee, Storer began to capitulate. "No, sir. I
would have, in a sense, conflict of fiduciary responsibilities toward the
beneficiaries of the trust on the one hand and toward the stockholders
of the corporation on the other." " The court sensed the hesitancy.
But insofar as the beneficiaries are concerned I take it that
you would recognize that you would have to obtain the best
business deal for them that was possible in any reorganization
regardless of any fiduciary relationship that may have accom-
panied the Cosgroves' [sic] in their holding of this stock? 5
Storer abandoned the field completely: "As you outline the situation,
sir, my responsibility to my beneficiaries, sir, would be primary." 56
With this the court administered the coup de grace: "And I take it
under those circumstances you would feel justified in voting for the
most favorable consideration that could be obtained by the beneficiaries
even though it diluted the B stockholders' equity in the corporation?" 5
Storer closed the discourse with a dejected "Yes, your Honor." 8
In the court's hypothesis one salient fact which would have facili-
tated the solution escaped the expert Storer's attention. The mere inter-
position of a trustee between a beneficiary and a control-ownership of
stock should not thereby insulate the beneficiary from the fiduciary duties
of the office of control. The trustee is the beneficiary's representative.
The shareholder-control unrepresented by a trustee would have the fidu-
ciary duty of control. Represented, he continues to have the same duty
through his trustee. The beneficiary's duties now become the trustee's
duties. The trustee is the alter ego of the beneficiary, and must act
exactly as the beneficial owner would act were he without the trust. To
guide his own judgment, therefore, Storer could forget he was a trustee
and conduct himself as control, with all of control's duties.
As the representative of control, the trustee owed his primary obli-
gation to the common good of the entity, his secondary to each of the









tody as control was far broader than his custody of the individual
shareholdings. As control, a trustee must inaugurate a corporate struc-
ture beneficial to the entire entity. He could neither accept a premium
for doing his duty nor favor the beneficial holder of the "twenty-three"
shares at the expense of the corporation.
In the court's hypothetical, therefore, the new control, lodged in
the beneficiaries and exercised by Storer as their representative, would
be bound as thoroughly as its predecessor control to correct the struc-
tural defects, without exacting a premium for performing its fiduciary
duty.
The possibilities for conflict are limited only by the ingenuity of
the human mind. The fallible, susceptible human being who holds the
office of control usually occupies another corporate office. The result
is invariably a conflict of interest. If control is also the chief executive
officer, the temptation is a salary in excess of true worth; if a share-
holder, a selfish and reckless dividend policy; if a consumer, favored
sales allocation at favored prices. And so it goes through every facet
of corporate assets, prerogatives, and remuneration.
Idealistically the answer may lie in restricting the officer to the
sole position of control. But this is impossible in our present corpo-
rate structure. In the end, therefore, the realistic solution is that need-
less conflicts must be kept at a minimum, and courts and commentators
must educate the corporate community to the law of control through
firm pronouncements in decision and comment."9
d. Other Spheres of Duty
Corporate control has entrusted to the board of directors a more
limited custody. Most jurisdictions spell out this delegation in general
terms, which recognize the traditional boundaries but also permit such
leeway as particular circumstances would demand.6"
59 In 1949 Nathan Lobell, then Executive Adviser to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, revealed a subtle understanding of this problem:
The whole problem of corporate management is a facet of our latter-day
split between ownership of wealth and the control thereof. But, if our experi-
ence at the S.E.C. has been in any sense typical, the really crucial ethical
problems that have arisen in dealing with corporate management have grown
out of management's ownership of a stake in the enterprise. While we once
stood at the crossroads facing, on the one hand, the path of merging manage-
ment responsibility with management's stake in the business and, on the other,
the creation of a class of disinterested fiduciaries, we have-whether we like
it or not-taken the second road. It no longer makes any sense to require
that either a substantial portion of corporate wealth be owned by the manage-
ment or that a substantial portion of management's wealth be invested in
the corporation. The hope for effective and honest management lies in
evolving a class of financially disinterested managers who accept, as part of
a working code, the simple rudiments of honest politics.
Letter From Nathan D. Lobell to the Author, February 7, 1949.
60 "The business of every corporation . . . shall be managed by a board of at
least three [3] directors . . . ." MIcH. ComP. LAws § 450.13 (Supp. 1956).
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The board of directors in its turn subdelegates a yet narrower orbit
of responsibility to the chief executive officer or, in a large concern, to
a small group of principal officers. These officers transmit varying
degrees of responsibility to others, but the major concentration of con-
trol is in the office of control itself, the board, and the officers. The
limits and hierarchy of these three spheres are inviolate. If control,
director or officer steps over the line he is either out of order, or is
rightly or wrongly assuming a second official position.
A great danger lies in a court's refusal to recognize that control
need not necessarily be joined to any other office. Indeed, control may
not even be lodged in creditor, labor, consumer, or government, but may
exist completely outside the corporate venture. When a court cannot
identify control with a familiar office and apply the traditional fiduciary
duty of that office to control, the result could be the complete failure to
place liability on corporate control, if that is where it belongs in the
particular case.
61
The court in Feldmann was cognizant of the distinct offices, but
found it unnecessary to define the various spheres since it was able to
fix responsibility on Mr. Feldmann in any event. Since he was control,
chief executive officer, and chairman, he was simultaneously occupying,
in addition to being a dominant shareholder, all three distinct offices
which are the major repositories of responsibility in the corporation.
"In this case the violation of duty seems to be all the clearer because
of this triple role in which Feldman appears, though we are unwilling
to say, and are not to be understood as saying, that we should accept
a lesser obligation for any one of his roles alone." 62 Had Feldmann
been corporate control and not, however, majority shareholder, chief
executive, or chairman of the board, it is possible that the Feldmann
court might not have held him liable.
2. Finality: The Nature of the Duties
Consideration of the ends of control does not prescind from the
pattern of the three major spheres of responsibility. Rather, an in-
quiry into the nature of each office adds to the knowledge of control.
The overriding objective of the corporate entity is its own com-
mon good, which is, generally, to make profits. This primary goal
61 My brothers' opinion does not specify precisely what fiduciary duty Feld-
mann is held to have violated or whether it was a duty imposed upon him as
the dominant stockholder or as a director of Newport. Without such specifi-
cation I think that both the legal profession and the business world will find
the decision confusing and will be unable to foretell the extent of its impact
upon customary practices in the sale of stock.




is complemented by a complexus of lesser ends: the welfare of each
member. The immediate purpose of the office of control is to attempt
to create and maintain the best corporation possible. As the office upon
which the ultimate responsibility for the achievement of this objective
devolves, control must formulate and establish the overall program of
corporate policy and supervise its implementation at the highest level.
The extent to which control enters into detail in policy formulation and
supervision varies between the extremes of a well-established, smoothly
coordinated control situation and a troubled corporation in need
of rehabilitation and major policy overhaul. The exact nature of cor-
porate control shows itself most impressively in the three major divi-
sions of policy formation.
Logically, control's first responsibility is that of providing the best
possible corporate structure. Prior to incorporation, control must
study the purposes and objectives of the corporation and produce arti-
cles and bylaws which will achieve the corporate goals. Control must
reconcile the total common good with the obligations to the constituent
members. As the years pass, control must continually review the
structure to adjust to changing times. Control's next responsibility is
to establish an enlightened managerial policy. If the corporation is a
Saks Fifth Avenue, is it to hew invariably to a luxury line? If, on the
other hand, it is an E. J. Korvette, must it remain unswervingly in the
discount line or is there room in corporate policy to move into the
"Fifth Avenue field"? In general, control must make top-level policy
decisions including what the corporate image should be and when to
economize, expand, or retrench. Control's final responsibility is to
select the board of directors and to seek out competent men for the
particular type of business. Control properly delegates responsibility
to the directors, but must continually supervise their conduct. As with
the father in the home, control can never desert final responsibility.
This principle was summarized by the Feldmann court: "[T]he same
rules should apply to his fiduciary duties as majority stockholder, for
in that capacity he chooses and controls the directors, and thus is held
to have assumed their liability." ' Thus control is responsible for the
activities of the least agent of the corporation insofar as these activities
are referable to control's policy and supervisory responsibility. This
duty of continual surveillance extends as well to corporate structures and
managerial policy.
The board of directors, in turn, has a double objective. It must
interpret the philosophy and policy of control to the officers and must
formulate its own broad, albeit second-level, policy, conformable of
63 Id. at 176.
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course to control's norms. Both of these objectives are carried out in
the three areas of policy formation previously discussed. The board
might initiate necessary amendments to bylaws or articles. By resolu-
tion of the board, managerial salary policies can be established or
changed, general economy programs effected, major litigation approved.
Finally, the selection and promotion of top officers is a principal board
responsibility.
On the third echelon, the major objective of the chief officers is the
day-to-day implementation of the policy formulated by control and in-
terpreted by the board. Except, perhaps, to make recommendations
for needed changes, the officers will not be directly concerned with the
corporate structure, but rather with managerial policy, the orderly ad-
ministration of the business, research and development, manufacturing
policy, distribution, and sales. The chief executive officer selects sec-
ond level officers and major department heads. To these, of course,
there will be delegation of responsibility on the lowest levels.
The principal role of the shareholder is to supply risk capital.
Since the shareholder qua shareholder has been entrusted with little
other responsibility, he plays a minor role in the corporation. How-
ever, for both historic and intrinsic reasons, the shareholders have a
second duty to perform. In the formative days of the corporation,
control was almost universally lodged with the shareholder. As a
result the law has identified the two positions. Theoretically and for-
mally this identification has endured to the present day. The share-
holders, therefore, acting at their meetings, remain the conduit for the
expression of the policies of control. This formalism must be observed
even if the shareholder happens also to be control. The only time the
shareholder speaks qua shareholder is at the annual or special meetings.
However, except in the smallest corporation, policy is made, even by
shareholder-control, prior to the shareholders' meeting.
This secondary function of the shareholder, however, can on occa-
sion take on unwonted importance. When a dissident nonshareholding
group determines to wrest control from the incumbent, equally non-
shareholding, board, the shareholders, for a fleeting period, have the
power to determine control. Momentarily and partially, control also
lodges in the shareholder in the rare success of an isolated proposal
deemed "proper subject" 64 for shareholder action. Only on occasions
like these does the formalism of the shareholders' meeting evanesce.
The objectives of the remaining parties to the venture are not rele-
vant to the question of corporate control. Only when creditor, con-
sumer, labor, or government also occupy the office of control do any
64 Some philosophical insights bearing on the present discussion can be gained
from Proper Subject: A Symposium, 34 U. DEr. L.J. 517 (1957).
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questions arise. Furthermore, since the purposes of these four offices
are so well defined, it is not difficult to segregate their duties from
corporate control.
B. The Authority of Corporate Control
Corporate control is a responsibility. This responsibility, the
duties inhering in the office, is the fiduciary duty of control. Set off
against the duties is a correlevative complexus of rights. There should
be no liability without culpability; there can be no culpability without
ability; and there can be no ability without rights. In the concrete,
these rights are nothing else than the great body of corporate assets
placed at the disposal of the office to enable it to meet its goal. The
word "assets" is used here in the broadest possible sense. It represents
everything of value entrusted to control for use in achieving the objec-
tives of the office.
Since these rights are appurtenant to the office, they are available
to control at every point in the span of corporate activity. Correspond-
ingly, however, these prerogatives are limited to official acts, and con-
trol is of course accountable for the disposition of these assets. As the
New York Court of Appeals phrased it, control
was bound to account . . . for all moneys that came into
his hands by virtue of his official acts . . . . The election
of directors, and the transfer of the management and prop-
erty of the corporation, were official acts, and whatever money
he received from such official acts were moneys derived by
virtue of his office, for which we think he should account. 5
The utilization of these rights in official acts can be categorized in the
same three areas: corporate structure, managerial policy, selection of
directors and officers.
1. The Corporate Structure
The principal justification advanced by the court in Green Giant
for giving the Cosgroves $2 million was the bestowal of voting rights.
Without voting stock, listing on a major exchange was blocked, market-
ability hampered, and expansion opportunities, equity financing, and
diversification by merger and acquisition were made more difficult.
66
Topnotch talent, moreover, shied away from such close control.67 All
65 McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
68 Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 1962).
67 There was a genuine fear among top management that the death of E. B.
Cosgrove would find the control falling into undesirable hands. This fear was ex-
pressed as a desire to "promote management continuity." Record, pp. 75 (testimony
of W. F. Dietrich), 100 (testimony of L. E. Felton).
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of these disabilities would be removed by the reorganization of the
corporate structure, the chief feature of which was the transfer of voting
rights from control to the holders of 99 percent of the corporate equity.
For the purposes of a deeper investigation of the nature and duties of
control it will be assumed, contrary to the facts, that there was an
actual relinquishment of control by the Cosgroves. This, of course,
was the assumption on which the arguments of the two courts were
founded. "The argument that the family, relatives and friends of
Edward B. Cosgrove would continue in control of the company is
without any foundation in fact." 68 The plaintiff argued that control
remained where it always was, merely slipping slightly from the abso-
lute security of absolute control to the practical security of effective
control.69
The Cosgroves, occupying the office of control, had determined to
pay themselves $2 million for an improvement in the structure which
good business judgment indicated was necessary or advisable for cor-
porate and shareholder well-being. At this point the court was faced
with a dilemma. Either the Cosgroves as control were paying the
Cosgroves as shareholders-directors $2 million for the performance of
an official act of control, or the Cosgroves were receiving $2 million for
the sale of control without any consideration beyond the control itself.70
This dilemma is highlighted by the fact that it was the business
judgment and official act of the Cosgroves which erected the deficient
corporate structure in 1923,"' not that this really made any difference
in 1960. Whether they created the condition in the beginning or not,
control was dutybound to utilize all of the rights of its office to correct
any structural inadequacies. More specifically, these prerogatives (and
consequent duties) consisted of the following: the study of the defective
structure, the utilization of the decision of the board, the advice of in-
68 Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 208 F. Supp. 754, 765 (D. Minn. 1961).
69 Brief for Appellant, pp. 51-54, Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667
(8th Cir. 1962).
70 The district court was not prepared to admit that unadorned control was being
sold by the Cosgroves for $2 million. "After due consideration, the Court is satisfied
that a fair analysis of all the circumstances justifies a finding that . . . the premium
shares .. . is [sic] commensurate with the benefit received by the corporation ....
The opinion makes it clear that the improvement of the corporate structure was this
"benefit received by the corporation." 208 F. Supp. at 762.
71 There is an interesting sidelight in Mr. Cosgrove's testimony as to the principal
reason for his continued failure to correct the corporate structure. He bad denied
voting rights to the Class B only as a temporary expedient.
I can tell you that my attitude through the whole thing was to keep control
until we were well on our way; we did not want to be raided. . . . I wanted
to see good management in charge before I let go. . . . Mr. Felton so emerged
and I made him president. Prior to the time Mr. Felton took over as presi-
dent I had not been prepared to give voting rights to the Class B stock;




vestment counsel, the formulation of the recapitalization plan, the sub-
mission of the plan to the shareholders for approval, and the imple-
mentation of the plan. The right of control to use these facilities of its
office was essential to the performance of its fiduciary duty. This
raises the question of whether control should be paid $2 million for
doing its duty.72 If control is a personal asset, the Cosgroves could
conceivably be justified in placing that valuation on it and pocketing
the proceeds. If control is a corporate asset, however, the proceeds be-
long to all the shareholders rather than solely the shareholders in
control.
The shift from absolute to working control cost the public investor
$2 million in Green Giant. In Manacher v. Reynolds,7" exactly the
same gambit, used with a far larger firm, was worth $40 million.
The United States Foil Company had, as Green Giant, two classes
of stock, identical in every way except voting rights. The Reynolds
family held all of the 540,000 voting shares and the general public
8,594,032 nonvoting shares. Foil was actually a holding company for
50.09 percent of the stock of Reynolds Metal Company. By using these
millions of public-shareholder dollars the Reynolds family was in turn
able to control Reynolds Metal, the second largest integrated pro-
ducer of aluminum in the country.
This was a very expensive business for the public shareholders of
Foil. There were operating expenses for the holding company and
extra taxation on the double dividend declarations first by Metals to
Foil and then by Foil to the shareholder. These factors, plus the ab-
sence of the vote, were reflected in the value of the Foil stock on the
American exchange. For many years Foil nonvoting stock had sold
on the market at a full one third less than the value of the equity inter-
72 The expert witness for the plaintiff Honigman, Robert W. Storer, chairman
of the investment committee of the Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit phrased
this thought in these words:
In the first place, the progressive divorce between the equity interest and
the voting control has arisen over the years since 1923 out of the consistent
policy of causing all new common shares to be Class B shares. If, as a result
of this policy, the corporation is disadvantaged by the present capital structure
this has arisen on the initiative and on the consistent policy of the Class A
stockholders. These, through their control of the membership of the board
of directors, have worked themselves gradually into a position which, to my
mind, is tantamount to voting trustees with fiduciary responsibilities to their
fellow stockholders. Under these conditions I believe that any action, any
affirmative action which can be taken by the Class A stockholders, acting
through their board to benefit the corporation, which does not result in out-
of-pocket cost to them, is affirmative action which they are due to take and
should take vis-a-vis the Class B stockholders who are essentially the equity
and the corporation here.
Record, pp. 280-81.
73 165 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1960), 109 U. PA. L. REV. 887 (1961). "What is
arguably an abdication of its supervisory role in the settlement perhaps flows from
the court's prior conclusion that the right to any premium rested on the family's power
to demand it . . . . 109 U. PA. L. Ray. at 891.
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est which it represented in Reynolds Metals. This so-called discount
factor amounted to approximately $140 million.
It is understandable that the public shareholders of Foil had been
agitating for the liquidation of the company. If Foil were liquidated,
extra operating expenses, extra taxes, and the $140 million discount
would be eliminated. In spite of years of pleading by the public share-
holders, the Reynolds family refused to discontinue the use of the pub-
lic money. When litigation was finally initiated by a public share-
holder, the Reynolds group came forward with a plan which differed
only in details from the Green Giant plan. The Reynolds family wanted
three shares of new stock for each of their voting shares, a $40-million
premium. Under the Reynolds settlement the family would own 17.4
percent of the new common which constituted operating control. With-
out the premium shares, they would receive 14.2 percent of the new
Metals common.
Here again was the Green Giant problem. Was the corporate
structure of Foil the best for the entity and its members, or did it serve
only one party who happened also to be in control? Did control exer-
cise the prerogatives and rights of its office in the performance of its
fiduciary duty to the entity and to all its members? Did it have the
right to use these corporate assets for its own personal benefit?
The court stated the problem exactly:
The issue is whether the A may fairly agree with the B to
take appropriate action to remove the discount in return for
premium [sic] amounting to one-third of the discount.74
This being so, the A shareholders hold the key with
which to unlock the "discount" treasure chest for the B. No
other factor being present, they may demand a reasonable
premium for the use of their key.75
The key was improvement of the corporate structure. This was a cor-
porate asset, a right entrusted to control to enable it to perform its
duties. The use of this key should have been a routine operation, a
fundamental fiduciary duty of control, and the Reynolds court realized
this. "[T]he hard fact of life is that the proposed action by the A
[the alteration of the corporate structure] is an indispensable prerequi-
site to the realization of any benefit by the B from the elimination of
the discount." " The minority shareholder contended that control
violated its fiduciary duty; that the violation "consisted of their exact-
ing the 3 for 1 premium as their price for letting 'their' board act on a
74 165 A.2d at 750.




merger . ... , 77 The court, however, approved the settlement and
was "hesitant to say that the settlement was so unfair that it should be
rejected." 78
One conclusion emerges from Green Giant and Reynolds. Corpo-
rate control in each case was faced with the responsibility of providing
the best possible corporate structure for the entity and its constituent
members. At the disposal of control was the entire corporate apparatus
with which to fulfill this responsibility. The utilization of these assets
should have been no more than the performance of the fiduciary duty of
control.
2. Managerial Policy
The corporate assets at control's disposal for the performance of
managerial duties range from the picayune perquisites of the office-
yachts, clubs, secretaries, and chauffeurs-to the determination of im-
portant policies of purchase and sale, of initiation of litigation and
declaration of dividends. Entrusted with a profusion of rights and
prerogatives, the temptation is intense to regard these corporate means
to the corporate end as private powers. Although they clearly belong
to the corporation in the beginning, they somehow mysteriously become
transformed into personal privileges and chattels.
Corporate control has a daily array of lesser corporate assets
placed at its disposal in the performance of its duties. Some of these,
of course, are included contractually, directly or indirectly, as acknowl-
edged elements of its just compensation. With the remainder and
greater majority, however, control faces a double difficulty. First, they
may not even be appurtenances of the office of control at all, but rather
set aside for the use of other offices within the corporate entity. Sec-
ondly, if they are properly at its disposal, control must remember that
they are nonetheless not a personal possession. It may not appropriate
them altogether, divert them to purely personal use, or preempt assets
unnecessary in quantity or quality.
It is a relatively simple matter for a person in control to com-
mandeer the plant maintenance crew, and have them build a new sun
porch to his home or a sprinkling system in his garden. There are
many more subtle areas, such as credit cards, business vacations, town
clubs, country clubs, and hunting lodges. Unless these privileges are
acknowledged forms of compenssation, they should be categorized as
direct appropriation of corporate assets or a saddling of the corporate
budget with expenses unwarranted by the objectives of the entity. The
7 7 Id. at 748.
7 8 Id. at 755.
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excess may be either one of quantity or quality. The principle of
finality draws a definite line as to both. The means must conform to
the end.
The Feldmann litigation highlighted a far more serious preemption
of corporate assets in the managerial policy field. The plaintiff de-
scribed the premium of $1.3 million over the intrinsic value of Mr.
Feldmann's shares as "compensation for the sale of a corporate asset,
a power held in trust for the corporation by Feldmann as its fidu-
ciary." " The Second Circuit concluded that "in a time of market
shortage, where a call on a corporation's product commands an unusu-
ally large premium, in one form or another, we think it sound law that
a fiduciary may not appropriate to himself the value of this premium." "
The court could scarcely have expressed the fundamental philosophy
more aptly. Here was a corporate means, the managerial policy of
product distribution to customers, to the attainment of the overall
corporate end, the prosperity of entity and members.
The parallel with Green Giant when viewed from this particular
aspect is noteworthy. The Cosgroves had a duty to provide Green
Giant with the best possible corporate structure. Feldmann had a duty
to pursue the most enlightened management policy for the benefit of
Newport.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to regard Feldnznn from a
different viewpoint. One could concentrate on the benefits, the interest-
free prepayments, inuring to the corporation instead of the policy which
produced the benefits. From either aspect, however, both the gain
from the policy and the policy itself belonged to the entity, not to Feld-
mann personally; therefore, he could hardly sell them."' The court
properly held Feldmann to a fiduciary duty to formulate managerial
policy for the sole benefit of the corporation.
[T] he responsibility of the fiduciary is not limited to a proper
regard for the tangible balance sheet assets of the corporation,
but includes the dedication of his uncorrupted business judg-
ment for the sole benefit of the corporation, in any dealings
which may adversely affect it. . . . Although [this] . .
is particularly relevant to Feldmann as a director, the same
rule should apply to his fiduciary duties as majority stock-
holder, for in that capacity he chooses and controls the di-
rectors, and thus is held to have assumed their liability.
82
79 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955).
80 Id. at 178.
81 Thus, the $1.3 million paid Mr. Feldmann could be viewed as a present accumu-
lation of future interest-free prepayments which would otherwise have later benefited
corporation and shareholders.
82 219 F.2d at 176. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol.112:22
CORPORATE CONTROL
The report which outlined the Green Giant plan of recapitalization
also presented a revealing list of so-called "Advantages of Control." 83
The list presents an excellent example of the possibilities for personal
appropriation of corporate assets in the field of managerial policy. An
introductory paragraph restates the popular misconception that these
prerogatives of control belong personally to the individual not the
office.8
In considering the advantages of control to Class A stock-
holders we are not primarily concerned with advantages from
the possible illegal actions. However, there are many possible
actions which might be adverse to the Class B stockholders
but are either legal or on the borderline. Specific areas of
such action are as follows.'
Among the "specific areas of such action," the report lists one
which is peculiarly related to the Feldmann-type subversion of mana-
gerial policy:
Entering into contracts with suppliers or agents owned
by the Class A stockholders could be advantageous. How-
ever, opportunities to do this are probably limited and the
advantages small. Contracts not made on an arms-length
bargaining basis would certainly be open to attack. 6
Reference was made passim by various officers of Green Giant that such
opportunities for adverse contracts could occur, for example, in the
purchase of tin cans, labels, and unprocessed vegetables.8
S3 Record, pp. 338-40. The report was prepared by Glore, Forgan & Co.
84 The answer filed by the defendants in Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 At. 428
(1914), expresses this attitude: "'The price fixed for the stock itself was $165 per
share . . . and the additional compensation that we were to receive for parting with
our control was an entirely private business matter. . . . In the sale of our stock,
and in all that we did in connection therewith, we acted solely as individual owners,
. . . and never did any act in connection therewith as directors.'" Id. at 434, 91 Atl.
at 431. The court, however, held that "all money thus made belongs either to the
corporation, or, in a case like the present, in common to its shareholders .... " Id.
at 437, 91 Atl. at 432.
8 5 Record, p. 338. (Emphasis added.)
8
6 Id. at 339. An analysis of the implications of these "Advantages to Class A
Stockholders of Control" is intriguing. Three distinct conclusions stand out:
(1) It would be unjust were any inferences of reprehensible past conduct made
from these statements. L. E. Felton, president of Green Giant, testified on cross-
examination that "The Class A stockholders did not enter into any adverse contracts
with the company." Id. at 86. (2) There was no reason to suppose Green Giant
control itself would indulge in the future in these suggested practices. (3) What
Glore, Forgan, and hence Green Giant control, did have in mind was that a purchaser
might indulge in these possible practices, might pay Green Giant for the opportunity
to avail itself of these advantages, and that Green Giant control therefore deserved
$2 million because it held the key to unlock these treatsures to such a purchaser.
8
7 Id. at 87 (testimony on cross-examination of L. E. Felton).
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Numerous instances can be cited of advantages which are redolent
of the recapitalization report and the Feldmann allocation of sales.8"
In the classic case of Sher v. Sandler,89 one partner bought out the
other and thereby guaranteed to himself the undisclosed advantages of
a marked increase in corporate business. The court ordered restitution.
In addition, control might traffic in customer lists, or, as the Feldmann
court suggests, in the sale "of corporate good will" 9 or latent produc-
tive capacity. However, these are all patently corporate assets.
L. E. Felton, President of Green Giant, mentioned the use of the
corporate trademarks as "one other advantage of the A stock." " This
would be equally true of such other rights as patents, copyrights, and
the like. A prolific source of litigation has been appropriation by con-
trol of the benefits to an acquiring corporation of a net operating-loss
deduction which can be carried over as a tax credit against future earn-
ings.9" In Keely v. Black corporate control accepted a substantial gra-
tuity for relinquishing territorial rights of a small local telephone com-
pany to the Bell system.93 In the well-known cases of Young v. Higbee
Co.' and Clarke v. Greenberg 95 pending litigation was compromised.
All these are examples of the appropriation by control of valuable cor-
porate assets in the field of managerial policy.
Porter v. Healy 9 and Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Seltzer 97 are two classic opinions which support the proposition that
it is the essence of the duty of control to formulate and implement an
enlightened managerial policy. Both opinions, written by Justice
Moschzisker of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, describe the duties
8 8 The following are instances in which control has appropriated corporate assets
in the purchase or sale of goods: Price v. Standard Oil Co., 55 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup.
Ct), inodified, 77 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 1945) (sales); Bliss Petroleum Co. v.
McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N.W. 53 (1931) (purchase); Durfee v. Durfee & Can-
ning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948) (extra charges exacted through
dummy middleman set up by a director); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini
Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 291 P.2d 666 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (corporate profits
siphoned off through wholly-owned sales corporation). In the Deep Rock case, Taylor
v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), contracts adverse to Deep Rock
were set up by the Byllesby control group providing for management and supervision,
rentals, and heavy-interest loans. These machinations are detailed in Bayne, The
Deep Rock Doctrine Reconsidered (pts. 1-2), 19 FORDHAM L. Rav. 43, 152 (1950).
Another gross instance was the adverse management and supervision contract imposed
on the Mayflower Hotel by the Hilton control group. Mayflower Hotel Stockholders
Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
89 325 Mass. 348, 90 N.E.2d 536 (1950).
90 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955).
91 Record, p. 87.
92 See generally Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALif. L. Rxv. 1, 16
(1956).
93 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
94 324 U.S. 204 (1945).
95 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
V6244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914).
o7227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910).
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of directors of corporations, but their analysis is equally applicable to
control, wherever it exists.
The principle is well established that those in control of
the management of a corporation are under an inherent obli-
gation not in any manner to use their positions to advance
their individual interests as distinguished from the interests
they represent .... 98
In the Porter case the corporate asset involved was a public utility
franchise. The Porter court concluded its opinion with a trenchant
analysis of the duties of control:
Although the stock of one who is a director of a corporation
is his individual property, to be dealt with as he pleases, and
to be sold for such a price as he may be able to get for it, either
in association with others or alone, yet, his official position is
not his individual property in any sense, and he has no right,
either directly or indirectly, to use it for his own selfish ends;
when he does so, and thereby derives a gain that can be rea-
sonably traced to such an abuse, all money thus made belongs
either to the corporation, or, in a case like the present, in
common to its shareholders ..
In the Seltzer case the "effort to get control . . . was solely for
the purpose of forcing the sale of its property . . . ,, ' The court
held corporate control to "an inherent obligation not to in any manner
use their positions to advance their individual interests as distinguished
from the interests of their corporation." 101
"The director of a corporation is a trustee for the entire body
of stockholders, and by assuming the office he undertakes to
give his best judgment in the interests of the corporation in
all matters in which he acts for it, untrammeled by any hostile
interest in himself or others; and all secret profits derived by
him in any dealings in regard to the corporate enterprise must
be accounted for to the corporation." 102
3. The Selection of Directors and Officers
The sixth 103 and last of the Green Giant report's "advantages"
evaluates the third category of corporate prerogatives:
98 Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 435, 91 Ati. 428, 431 (1914).
09 Id. at 437, 91 Atl. at 432.
100 Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 415, 76 Atl. 77,
78 (1910).
.10 Id. at 416-17, 76 Atl. at 79.
1o2 Id. at 417, 76 AtI. at 79, paraphrasing Byrd Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157
Pa. 278, 287-88, 27 AtI. 750, 752 (1893).
103 Other advantages suggested by the report are: obtaining control to secure a
capital gain by liquidating the company, arranging mergers and consolidations ad-
vantageous to the controlling persons' outside interests, cutting or eliminating dividends
to avoid personal income taxes, granting stock options. Record, p. 339.
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From a practical standpoint, it would seem that the chief
advantage of control is the right to elect the principal officer of
the corporation and thereby to obtain the largest salary that
could not be attacked in the courts plus other perquisites of
the office including such things as stock options, pensions, in-
surance coverage, et cetera.
10 4
The right of control to appoint major officials is undoubtedly one of
the chief means of promoting the ends of the corporation.10 5 Over
sixty years ago the New York court in McClure v. Law properly char-
acterized the law on the subject:
The election of directors, and the transfer of the management
and property of the corporation, were official acts, and what-
ever money he received from such official acts were moneys
derived by virtue of his office, for which we think he should
account. 06
So also Judge Swan dissenting in Feldmann:
Consequently, if the price paid for Feldmann's stock included
a payment for voting to elect the new directors, he must ac-
count to the corporation for such payment, even though he
honestly believed that the men he voted to elect were well
qualified to serve as directors. He cannot take pay for per-
forming his fiduciary duty.'
Whatever may be the particular prerogative or right encompassed
in the authority of control-whether it concerns corporate structure,
managerial policy, or the selection of directors and officers-that power
is not a personal possession or privilege but an incident of office which
remains in the office.
C. The Remuneration of Corporate Control
1. Monetary Remuneration
An adequate compensation is the reward for the proper utilization
of the rights and the performance of the duties of custody. Remunera-
tion is proportioned to performance. The compensation due to control
is relative to the manner in which control employs the prerogatives of
the office. This is the principle of quid pro quo so assiduously pro-
tected by the law.
'
0 4 Id. at 340.
105 See authorities cited in Jennings, supra note 92, at 15 n.54.
106161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
107 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
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The delicate balance between performance and emolument is not
peculiar to the office of control alone. No party to the corporate ven-
ture should be compensated for performance of the duties of another
office, or for work he should have done but never did. The labor done
determines the remuneration.
Four primary tenets must be emphasized: the office possesses the
duties; the office possesses the rights; the officeholder receives the emolu-
ment; upon the relinquishment of the office, the successor receives the
duties, rights, and emolument.
Two popular fallacies have resulted from failure to apply these
tenets: that the person can somehow continue to be compensated even
after he quits control; that some forms of compensation become perma-
nent possessions of the individual and are not perquisites attached to
the office.
The failure to distinguish corporate assets at the disposal of the
office from personal possessions of the individual is the first great
source of error plaguing the concept of control. The second major
problem is confusion between compensation for labors actually per-
formed and compensation for work never done--either before, during,
or after the period of employment.
Theoretically, and also practically, corporate control is the most
important and most valuable party to the enterprise. The contributions
of the top-level control group to a complex modern corporation may
appear slight in point of time and physical energy expended, but they
are undeniably the prevailing and crucial element in the success or fail-
ure of the corporation. The compensation of control must match these
enormous benefits. This fact has produced a marked antithesis in the
present extralegal status of control. On the one hand, control deserves
great rewards which should be distributed through appropriate and
acknowledged channels. On the other, control cannot be permitted to
retain unowned assets and unearned recompense. This antithesis bur-
dens the law with a paradoxical challenge: to establish standard and
acceptable processes for adequately compensating control for its vast
labors, and to outlaw both the individual's personal appropriation of
official, corporate assets and the officeholder's personal retention of
unjust compensation either during or after the tenure of office.
Meeting the first challenge would help to eliminate the second.
Were control properly compensated, the temptation to appropriate
would diminish. Ideally, there should be two distinct categories of
control compensation: direct emolument awarded in the traditional
manner and indirect benefit flowing to control as an individual through
his second position in the enterprise, such as shareholder, bondholder,
or officer.
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Control should not be forced to secure a just recompense by the
temporary occupancy of an acknowledged, traditional position. This
does not mean, however, that if control is actually performing the duties
of two offices, it should not be paid for both. The point is that what-
ever else a person in control does he should receive the proper rewards
for the labors of control.
The facts in Green Giant provide an apt illustration of the double
deficiency which the law must correct. Mr. Cosgrove was ostensibly
being paid one salary for the performance of three offices. There was
little harm in this, however, since the $70,000 per annum plus collateral
benefits seemingly compensated him for all his labors. It would be
healthier, however, to attribute the sum to its specific sources. 08
Another facet of the Green Giant facts provides an instance of the
temptation facing the person in control when he quits the office. Al-
though the recapitalization report had taken "all factors into ac-
count," ' Mr. Cosgrove's annual income of $70,000 was an important
element in establishing his share of the $2 million premium. The re-
port capitalized and reduced to present worth an assumed salary of
$75,000 per year over a 20- to 25-year period which produced a valua-
tion of a million dollars, just for the salary."0 Since Mr. Cosgrove's
major allegation was that he was relinquishing the office of control
there is no perceptible reason why he should continue to be compen-
sated for the office. This salary should rightfully belong to his
successor.
1o0 The failure to denominate properly the compensation for each of Mr. Cosgrove's
three offices (control, board chairman, and chief executive officer) occasioned him
some unnecessary and unjustified embarrassment during the Green Giant litigation.
For six to eight years Cosgrove continued to receive approximately $70,000 per year
even though he had not occupied the presidency during this period. Perhaps he was
properly apologetic in that he had not taken any reduction in his remuneration upon
relinquishment of the presidency, but he nonetheless performed the valuable services
of control and board chairman, for which he certainly deserved a substantial recom-
pense. Had his various emoluments been listed over the years with the proper desig-
nations (e.g., control: $30,000; board chairman: $10,000; president: $30,000) he
would have been spared this uneasiness (had he, of course taken an appropriate,
e.g., $30,000-per-year, cut). He declared:
I attribute my job as Chairman of the Board to years of experience with the
company and not my ownership of class A stock [He undoubtedly meant
control]. I don't consider what I am being paid excessive for my years of
experience; a fellow who starts with three employees and $7,000 worth of sales
and runs it into a company with $64,000,000 worth of sales has obviously had
a lot of experience.
Record, p. 57.
'09 See id. at 122-23 (testimony of C. S. Vrtis), 216-17, 236, 242 (testimony
of F. W. Leich).
'' It is revealing to compare this capitalization of the salary with the statement
in the Glore, Forgan Report: "[T]he chief advantage of control is the right to elect
the principal officer of the corporation and thereby to obtain the largest salary that





Prestige in the community is an inestimable factor in total remu-
neration. Remuneration in the form of spiritual values can be the most
powerful incentive offered to control. Strict altruism manifested in a
desire to benefit corporation, community, and society is rarely a moti-
vation and hence an emolument to control. But the desire to express
organizational ability, to feel deeply the sense of accomplishment in a
complex job well done can constitute very satisfying compensation for
control.
One might hastily conclude that these nonfinancial forms of com-
pensation do actually become the permanent possession of the individual.
The contrary is true. As with the salary, they go with the office and
to the officeholder. The opportunity to organize, the power, the pres-
tige, all belong to the corporation. They may be paid out to the office-
holder as remuneration, but they are not his to keep or to sell to an-
other. They are to be returned to the corporation at the close of tenure
and passed on to his successor in office.
3. Control's Motivation
Almost universally, control coheres to another position in the en-
terprise. Since this is so, all the great efforts of control toward bene-
fiting the entity have the immediate effect of enhancing the value of
each constituent part, including control's. This is the primary motiva-
tion to control's activity and the chief remuneration. Mr. Cosgrove
described this emolument of control in a very earthy way: "Because I
control the company where most of my money sits. My estate is essen-
tially Green Giant Company." ill
If corporate control is also a shareholder, as was Mr. Cosgrove,
his indirect reward will consist in an appreciation of the value of the
stock and increased dividends. If it is a member of management his
month-to-month efforts will yield higher salary, greater prestige,
power, and satisfaction. These emoluments are the principal and sub-
stantial-and altogether legal--compensation of corporate control.
The three concepts-fiduciary duty, authority, remuneration-will
answer the questions posed by the salability of control. Has control an
independent value? Who owns it? May it be sold? By whom? For
whom? To whom? The answers to these queries will not advance
appreciably the thinking thus far outlined, but they will explore these
principles from different vantage points and give new perspective to
the fundamentals.
11 Record, p. 63.
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IV. THE SALABILITY OF CORPORATE CONTROL
The sale of corporate control highlights the subtle issues of the
concept. There is no impelling necessity to buy and sell control in
order to analyze it, but a buyer and a seller take a hard look at the
object of sale. The motivating desires of the buyer are evaluations of
at least one highly interested person. "It is sometimes said that value
is the price on which a willing and informed buyer and seller, neither
under compulsion to trade, would meet." 11 The expert Brandi in
Reynolds voiced the same thought: "I think the value which you can
obtain for something such as control 11. is an important factor in deter-
mining the value of relinquishing something." 114 This was the as-
112 Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179, 183 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 App.
Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947).
113 One of the inexplicable holdings in Reynolds remained equally unexplained
in Green Giant. Both courts based their decisions on the questionable assumption
that control actually changed hands. This assumption, of course, was fortunate from
the standpoint of the development of a philosophy of control. The discussion would
be circumscribed indeed were the only question the difference in value between absolute
and working control.
The facts, however, in both cases were to the contrary. In both, incumbent control,
at the most, relinquished absolute control for virtually impregnable working control.
To this day control is yet to shift to the public groups who paid the $40-million and
$2-million premiums.
In Green Giant a former board member stated: "The control is still going to
rest in the Cosgrove family." Record, p. 263. The fact is that Robert Cosgrove
recently moved from vice-president (at $40,000 per annum) to fill his father's place
as chairman.
In Reynolds the court remarked, "the A are not giving up voting control because
they will still have working control of Metals after the merger." Manacher v.
Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741, 751 (Del. Ch. 1960). This raises the practical question
(assuming that control has a legitimate sale value) : How valuable is the exchange
of absolute for effective control? The major difference between the two rests in
the possibility of a successful challenge by dissidents. The Reynolds court appre-
ciated this issue: "The court has substantial doubt that the relinquishment of absolute
voting control but the retention of working control has a value 'close' to that which
would be involved in sale of absolute control to a willing buyer." Id. at 753.
The court later made a remarkable statement in the light of its allowance of the
full $40-million premium:
The court frankly does not believe there is any explicit evidence of the value
of relinquishing absolute control which would justify the conclusion that a
particular figure would be fair to the A and B. For the reasons already stated
herein, I do not believe the basis for Mr. Brandi's testimony as to the value
of relinquishing control is sound here. I must frankly say that were I to view
the case apart from the stockholder action I would conclude that the premium
is excessive. I say this because the discount factor is not a "value" which
can be attributed to the A. Moreover, the A will retain working control.
I do, however, recognize that the A may fairly exact a premium as a condition
to the relinquishment of absolute voting control.
Id. at 754. The court nonetheless concluded: "The approval of a settlement requires
the court, inter alia, to exercise a businessijudgment. Under such an approach the
court would be hesitant to say that the settlement was so unfair that it should be
rejected." Id. at 755.
The practical question-beyond the major question of the salability of full control-
persists: Are $40 million and $2 million fair prices for the slip from absolute to
effective control ?
114 Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741, 753 (Del. Ch. 1960).
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sumption underlying the recapitalization reports "Advantages of
Control." 115
A dangerous fallacy lurks in this value-to-a-buyer norm. Profes-
sor Leech put his finger on it: "A person is in a 'valuable' position so
long as someone is anxious to bribe him." 118 He meant that the willing
and informed buyer might be motivated by a litany of illegitimate de-
sires. Such a buyer might not be "primarily concerned with advan-
tages from the possible illegal actions. However, there are many
possible actions which might be adverse to the [public] stockholders
but are either legal or on the borderline." "' Foolish and vain desires,
moreover, ought not be classed as bona fide values. One must sift the
legitimate from the questionable.
The salability of control nonetheless affords an admirable conclud-
ing dissection of the concept. Competent thinkers have placed a legiti-
mate sale value on control, and although Judge Swan, in Perlman v.
Feldmann, adduced no support for his stand, he stated: "Concededly a
controlling block of stock has greater sale value than a small lot." 118
Analytically, the salability of control resides in the intrinsic value
of the elements of the object of sale, the ownership of these elements,
the sale itself, the viewpoints of the buyer and the seller.
A. Evaluating the Elements of Control
The Person of the Officeholder. Ever since Berle's remarks in the
thirties, control has more or less been loosely connected in the public
mind with the individual person or persons who happen to occupy the
office. Certainly, however, the person occupying the office would not
be considered one of the elements constituting control itself. The in-
trinsic value of control does not include the personal qualities of excel-
lence of the officeholder. The incumbent may be astute, sagacious, in-
telligent, and scrupulously honest, but these valuable qualities do not
increase or decrease the inherent value of control in itself. The person
must be eliminated as an element of value.
The Fiduciary Duty of Control. This congeries of duties is a
responsibility. It is conceivable that a responsibility has a value in and
115 Record, p. 338. Counsel for Green Giant also relied heavily on evidence that
a third party had at some time previous engaged in preliminary negotiation toward
the purchase of Cosgrove control for a sum reputedly "in excess of $2 million." Brief
for Appellees, pp. 3, 13, Honigman v. .'Green Giant Co. The court used this, with
other factors, as evidence "that the mirfet of the Class A shares far exceeded the
market value of the same number of Class B shares .... " Honigman v. Green
Giant Co., 208 F. Supp. 754, 757-58 (D. Minn. 1961).
116 Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 757 (1956).
117 Record, p. 338.
118 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
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of itself, but most people would disagree. But, for the sake of argument,
it is advisable to consider the fiduciary duty as one element of value.
The Authority of Control. Without doubt the rights and preroga-
tives of the office are the chief value of control. The corporate assets
at control's disposal constitute a vital core of value intrinsic to cor-
porate control.
The Remuneration of Control. Could any of the many forms of
compensation be considered as constituents of the value of control?
The past emolument already paid to the officeholder for labors per-
formed is obviously no longer a present object of value to control. As
to future emolument, control has at hand for distribution all the forms
of future compensation: salary and bonuses, power and prestige. Argu-
ably, this is an element of value.
The Office Itself. Since the person holding the office is not a value
factor, does the office itself have an intrinsic value? The fiduciary duty,
the rights and prerogatives, and the power to award compensation all
inhere in the office, and it therefore follows that every element of value
belongs to the office. But the office alone, shorn of duties, rights, and
future emolument is absolutely worthless. All of the value, therefore,
resides in these three elements. The office itself is valuable only for what
it can accomplish.
B. Ownership of the Office
The officeholder is one of the two possible owners of control. Of
the five possible value elements of control, the person and the office
without its parts have already been eliminated. The question is whether
the officeholder owns any of the parts.
The fiduciary duty of control certainly does not follow the person
in control when he retires. The corporation still needs fulfillment of
these duties by his successor. In addition, the rights and prerogatives
of control are corporate assets to utilize in the fulfillment of the cor-
porate needs. Moreover, the corporation, not the person in office, has
in the corporate coffers money, power, prestige, which it may bestow on
the corporate agents who labor for the firm. These emoluments are
paid to, not owned by, the individual in control. Future emolument
remains for future disbursal.
If ownership of control is not in the officeholder, it must reside in
the corporation. Just as the office of chairman, of president, of chief
operating officer are parts of the corporation, so too is control an
integral part of the corporate structure. One generally does not say
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that a whole "owns" its part, but nonetheless the corporation owns all
its offices, including control.
As the corporation owns the offices, it also possesses the right to
fill them. The principal invariably selects the agent. The corporation
appoints its agents also, and control is the chief corporate agent. It is
true that the peculiar constitution of the corporation often renders it
necessary, or at least possible, for incumbent corporate control, as prin-
cipal agent, to make the selection of its successor. This is merely an-
other of control's routine and standard administrative duties, even
though it happens to be its last one. It is for such acts that it has been
regularly compensated. Although corporate control finds itself duty
bound to name its successor, this does not mean that it should receive
a premium for being a worthy servant.
A director is privileged to resign, but so long as he remains a
director he must be faithful to his fiduciary duties and must not
make a personal gain from performing them. Consequently,
if the price paid for Feldmann's stock included a payment for
voting to elect the new directors, he must account to the cor-
poration for such payment, even though he honestly believed
that the men he voted to elect were well qualified to serve as
directors. He cannot take pay for performing his fiduciary
duty.1
19
The law has always proscribed traffic in corporate offices. The
law may not have analyzed minutely the impropriety in the sale of an
office, nor reasoned the matter through to the essentials of duties, rights
and remuneration, but an innate sense of right order led the law to the
correct rule, broad as it was.
Trustees of corporations owe duties to others besides them-
selves; they have been placed in a position of trust by the
stockholders, and to those stockholders they must be faithful.
It is a violation of that trust for them to be bought out of
office. They may resign when they please, but they must not
make profit or benefit to themselves in the matter of such
resignation.'
The case of Porter v. Healy founded its decision "on the theory
that a majority of the directors of the corporation cannot 'barter their
offices for individual gain.' "121 The court granted recovery to the
plaintiffs because "the defendants sold this control as their individual
estate and received a special compensation for it." 122 The court con-
119 Id. at 179.
120 Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98, 100 (1880).
121 244 Pa. 427, 434, 91 Atl. 428, 431 (1914).
2 Id. at 433, 91 AtI. at 430.
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cluded with the categorical statement: "[H]is official position is not
his individual property in any sense . . . .". 1 Even Hill, who
condones a premium payment for control admits: "It can hardly be
doubted that a sale of control of American Telephone and Telegraph
Company at an excessive price, though purporting to be a sale of a
'controlling block' of shares, would be similarly condemned as the de-
livery of naked power for a private consideration." 124
The conclusion seems inescapable that the ownership of the office
rests in the corporation, and is in no way the personal possession of the
incumbent, transient, officeholder.
C. Analysis of the Sale
Characteristically, the actual sale of control is embodied in the
formality of a concomitant sale of a relatively large block of stock. It
is a rare day when naked control, completely isolated, is passed for
a price by the seriatim resignation of the incumbent board. This
would be entirely too bald and would clearly fall under the interdict
against the barter of the office. The sale therefore is camouflaged be-
hind the sale of the stock. Beyond the legal reasons, this artifice is also
prompted by a subliminal realization that the office is not for sale.
This cloak lessens the subconscious embarrassment attendant on un-
adorned traffic in control.
Courts and commentators have been deeply vexed with the task of
segregating the true value of the stock from the amount allegedly paid
for bare control.125  No tenable reason precludes an attempt at such
separation. The many pertinent considerations-market value, book
value, future earnings, liquidation, investment value 126 -undoubtedly
figured in the final computation by the district court on remand 2 7 in
Feldmann. There the shares were selling in the over-the-counter-
market below $12; the book value was $17.03; the Wilport syndicate
paid $20. The court determined that $1,339,769, the excess above
$14.67 per share (plus interest from the date of sale), constituted the
illicit amount "attributable to the sale of the corporate power." 128
123 Id. at 437, 91 Ati. at 432.
124 Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986, 998 (1957).
125 Leech, supra note 116, at 819-20, discusses in detail the factors involved. See
also Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178-80 (2d Cir. 1955) (Swan, J., dissenting);
Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIf. L. REv. 1 (1956).
126 See Application of Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 App.
Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947) ; in re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 29 Del. Ch.
480, 52 A.2d 6 (Ch. 1947) ; Jennings, supra note 143, at 1.
1
27 Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
128 Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955).
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The Pennsylvania Court in Porter v. Healy also succeeded in dif-
ferentiating the licit stock value from control (although admittedly it
was a simple chore since the defendants conceded the difference).
In considering this contention it is to be noted that the de-
fendants not only admitted in their testimony that the "con-
trol fund" was separate and apart from the price received for
their stock, but the answer filed by them, in speaking of the
sale of their holdings, expressly avers, "the price fixed for the
stock itself was $165 per share . . . and the additional
compensation that we were to receive for parting with our con-
trol was an entirely private business matter. . .. In the
sale of our stock, and in all that we did in connection there-
with we acted solely as individual owners, . . . and never
did any act in connection therewith as directors." 129
Thus differentiated, the Healy court ordered the return of " 'the con-
trol fund' of $86,830." 130
Feldmann and Healy do not mitigate the difficulties attendant on
the isolation of the licit value from the "control fund," but they do
indicate that such segregation is possible. However, the difficulty in
separating the true value of the stock from the amount paid for control
should not alter the conclusion that once the legitimate stock value has
been separated, there is nothing in the subject matter of the sale which
justly belongs to the selling officeholder. There remains only the office.
D. Viewpoints of the Buyer and the Seller
Any remaining queries conceivably can be answered by viewing
the sale through the eyes of buyer and seller. This approach should
also further differentiate legitimate from illegitimate buyer desires.
Fortunately, the courts long ago eliminated the gross cases of ille-
gitimate control purchase. 3' To this extent the problem has been
1 Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 434, 91 Ati. 428, 431 (1914).
130 Id. at 436, 91 At. at 431.
131 The parallel cases, Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941) and
Insuranshares v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940), presented
blunt examples of illegal sales and consequent, identical looting of liquid treasuries
through the sale of control. In Insuranshares, management had working control
(25 percent), sold its entire interest at $3.60 per share (with a market, over the
counter, at $1 to $1.25), and handed over the company and its investment portfolio
through the seriatim resignation of the board. The company was then stripped of
its assets and left a mere shell.
The court in Inmsranshares rejected the claim that "the transfer . ..was simply
a sale of stock, the passing of control being merely a normal concomitant. . . . This
view . . . is fundamentally wrong. If the whole record be read, I do not see how
the transaction can be considered as anything other than a sale of control, to which
the stock sale was requisite, but nevertheless a secondary matter." Id. at 24.
On this assumption the court commented on the role of control:
Those who control a corporation, either through majority stock owner-
ship, ownership of large blocks of stock less than a majority, officeholding,
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simplified and narrowed to the subtle and apparently unassailable
instances.
In pursuing the thesis of this Article there may be a tendency to
regard all buyer desires and motives as illegitimate. To the contrary,
an honest entrepreneur will have high-minded and commendable objec-
tives for taking over control. Foremost among these, and patently
laudable, is the legitimate purpose of improving the corporation, and
the value of his own interest, by his enlightened management. The
dissident minority shareholder might be genuinely and understandably
concerned about the future welfare of his investment. Possibly the
best protection for his interests is the assumption of control by one
competent to improve the company.
The buyer must be encouraged in these aspirations. However,
four questions arise and their answer should eliminate this last major
concern. Should the buyer pay a premium for this purpose? Does
such a premium, if paid, belong to the seller? By whom is the pre-
mium paid? Is this payment in fact a premium at all?
These questions are too inextricably intertwined to be answered
separately. The answer is that the buyer of control is actually not pay-
ing any premium at all. Consider, in two different factual situations,
the buyer's objectives to enhance the corporation and his investment.
If the buyer has sufficient capital he can best achieve his goal by
buying the entire enterprise---100 percent of the outstanding stock.
This removes any obstacles to his management. In a total purchase the
full price is paid for every legitimate value of the corporation, physical
assets, cash balances, accounts receivable, goodwill, and control, to-
gether with the desired opportunity to supervise entity and investment.
In a 100 percent purchase, moreover, the buyer pays each individual
shareholder his proper proportion of the total, including the proration
of that amount of money specifically referable to control. Thus the
holder of control, with 51 percent of the stock receives 51 percent of
the value, to the buyer, of the corporation.
If, on the other hand, the buyer does not have sufficient funds, he
may be able to purchase only working control. The basic equities,
however, have not changed. The fact that a part, rather than the whole,
has been purchased, does not alter the respective rights of all the share-
holders. As each had a proportioned share of the whole, so each has a
proportioned share of the part. The person in control should not now
management contracts, or otherwise, owe some duty to the corporation in
respect of the transfer of the control to outsiders. The law has long ago
reached the point where it is recognized that such persons may not be wholly
oblivious of the interests of everyone but themselves, even in the act of parting




exact 71 percent of the value of the corporation. He is selling no more
than before, and if he owns 51 percent of the stock, he should receive
only 51 percent of the total corporate value. The buyer must, there-
fore, prorate to all of the shareholders any sum greater than the seller's
proportionate interest in the corporation. With such a proration,
there would be no premium at all.
But if the buyer is forced to pay the seller more than the seller's
prorated share of the total corporate value, he is paying the right
amount to the wrong person.3 2 When the person in control sells at
a premium, he is denying other shareholders an opportunity to sell
their shares at a proper and higher price, and is appropriating the dif-
ference. To say that the so-called premium belongs to all the share-
holders is to say that the premium belongs to the corporation. This
completes the circle again, since the premium is for the office and the
office belongs to the corporation.
Another aspect of the sale demands consideration. Apart from
the question of whether the outgoing officeholder has a right to a pre-
mium, who should pay the premium? There are three possible payers:
the corporation itself, the shareholder, or a third-party purchaser. It
should be noted, however, that the corporation itself is indistinguishable
from all the shareholders. There is no difference in effect between the
shareholders paying the premium directly and the corporation paying
it out of surplus, since the effect of the corporate action is the interest
of all the outstanding shareholdings. If by chance one class of stock
bears the entire cost of the premium, for example, by a reduction of the
stated value of the class, there is a double inequity: the payment of the
undeserved premium to control and the discrimination in levying the
whole from one class rather than prorating it.
If the office of control is a corporate asset, then the third-party
purchaser should pay the premium to the corporation. Therefore, any
payment by a third party to an outgoing officeholder is in effect an in-
direct payment into the corporate till and then out of the till to the
outgoing control. From this aspect, all three cases-payment by cor-
poration, shareholder, third party-represent a deprivation of money
due and owing the corporate entity.
It is possible that some of the misunderstanding surrounding the
sale of control can be attributed to the latent, but important, factor of
legitimate but unpaid compensation. When the hardheaded business-
man is conscientiously convinced that as outgoing control he should
receive something more than the bare market value of his shares on a
1 32 In some cases, another motive for the payment of a premium on the purchase
of control could be the buyer's desire to avoid the expense of a proxy fight. This
situation could be solved by the passage of more imaginative corporate laws to reduce
the amount of time, money, and energy now necessary to oust poor control.
1963]
66 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
unit basis, he is perhaps merely claiming remuneration for years of
unrequited labor. Control, especially in the formative years of cor-
porate life, should be remunerated. In the very years when the cor-
poration is least able adequately to compensate control, the greatest
demands are made on his initiative, imagination, and energy. Only
unusual foresight could establish an exact formula of payment contin-
gent on success, or a formal plan of future and retroactive remunera-
tion. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the individual desires to settle
these deferred accounts at the time he surrenders control. Unfortu-
nately, he may term the account "something extra," which it really is
not. Even more unfortunately, especially for the attempts to under-
stand fully the salability of control, he may refer to this deferred com-
pensation as a just and legitimate sale value of control. Merely be-
cause the payment coincides with the sale of the majority stock inter-
est, it is not a sale value of control. Nor, for that matter, does it
preclude its payment at the time of quitting control. But it does mean
that deferred compensation, or a contingency-on-success payment, must
not be confused with a legitimate sale value of control. It is essen-
tially unrelated to the sale of control." 3
There are other factors which might aid in the explanation of
many misconceptions. In so complex a concept as control the mind can-
not quite shake off the accretions of years spent in the subliminal as-
sumption that control was a personal possession, not an office. Genera-
tions of honest businessmen have accepted without question the hard
facts of business life that control could be sold and the premium
pocketed by the seller.
The primary factor which has entrenched this fallacy in the Ameri-
can mind is historical. In the early years the American corporation
was predominantly one-man or closely held. In an incorporated part-
nership, or a privately held corporation, those in control were the cor-
poration. The only public concern was for the creditors. But when
the public entered the scene, as with Green Giant, the matter became
otherwise. The corporate assets remained, but the corporation was no
longer a personal possession. For twenty years Green Giant was rightly
regarded as the Cosgrove family estate. It is a traumatic, perhaps im-
133 The Internal Revenue Service has possibly so confused deferred compensation
with a premium for control. "Occasionally a large block may be held to be worth
more than the quoted price per unit multiplied by the number of shares in the block.
This is true of a block carrying with it the control of the corporation." RIA FED.
TAX COORDINATOR, § P-6211 (5), at 42171. See also § P-6211 (1), at 42169-70;
§ P-6215.4, at 42169-70. There is, however, nothing in Treasury Regulations, rulings,
or tax cases to warrant the conclusion that tax law recognizes a premium value as
such. Treas. Reg. §§20.2031-2(e), 25.2512-2(e) (1963); Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 4.02(g),
1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237; James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928); Estate of Telling,
3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 652 (1944).
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possible, feat to admit abruptly that the public now has a 99 percent
equity in that estate.
A second factor contributing to the fallacy is the subconscious im-
pulse to assert ownership of an enterprise when a person contributes
appreciable time, energy, and intellect to that enterprise. One forgets
that the compensation received over the years has presumably satisfied
the obligation of the employer. The error is human: "So much of it
is I, it should be mine." A competent cook will often express twenty-
five or thirty years of assiduous labor in terms of "my kitchen."
Part of the problem can be attributed to widespread and accepted
moral laxity. Even the most upright and conscientious, especially
after years of incumbency, may come to regard every season as open
season on the multitude of lesser corporate assets. The progress from
de ntinimis appropriation to major embezzlement may be long-term and
gradual, but nonetheless effortless. The federal district court in Backus
v. Finkelstein "" summed up the situation:
It is possible that defendants had no accurate knowledge or
clear conception of their duties, or of what the law required
of them as managing officers and owners of the majority of
the stock in the corporation in question. It is at least char-
itable to take this view, and it may be according to the fact.
It is not difficult to understand how in a somewhat vague and
blind way they may have reasoned that such success as at-
tended the corporation was largely due to their individual
efforts, and therefore that they should reap the reward to the
exclusion of all other persons. This may explain their course,
but it fails entirely to justify or excuse."
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate control is truly a corporate asset. All shareholders are
entitled to share equally in this asset. No individual or group of indi-
viduals may lawfully appropriate this asset solely for personal benefit.
Weaknesses withal, this principal proposition seems tenable. Un-
deniably, considerable refinement yet remains. It is hoped that the
courts and commentators will mull over these thoughts, strengthen the
weaknesses, and hand on to the next generation a more perfect con-
cept of control.
134 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927).
135 Id. at 359.
